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Abstract 
What accounts for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian 
state elections? In this paper we examine this question by testing an equilibrium model of 
political party numbers where the number of parties depend on the average size of state 
constituencies, voter turnout, the heterogeneity of the state’s electorate, constitutional and 
legislative rules that directly affect party numbers and per capita state incomes while 
controlling for a series of discrete political events that have influenced political parties. The 
analysis compares this model with one explaining the effective number of parties (ENP) and 
extends the analysis to consider the effect of political factors such as the openness and 
competitiveness of the upcoming election on the timing of the decision of political parties to 
enter and exit (and thus the rate of political party turnover). The analysis is further extended 
by allowing the level of development to interact with their party structures. 
JEL Code: D72, D73, P16, H70 
Key words:  number of political parties, Indian states, entry and exit of political parties, ENP, 
fixed effects poisson panel estimation 
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1.. Introduction 
In this paper we model the changing structure of political party equilibrium and test for its 
predicted effects on the number, entry, exit and turnover of political parties across a subset 
of major Indian states since Independence.1 In general, new parties form to promote parts of 
the political spectrum not represented by existing parties (Meyer and Miller, 2015) or to break 
from existing parties whose platforms, leadership or regional representation are insufficiently 
representative of sub-group aspirations (Brancati, 2008; Lago and Martinez, 2011; Larose, 
2017). The dimensionality of the issue space relative to the set of policies that any political 
party can hold means that it is unlikely that existing parties will generate the policy mix 
desired by all groupings within the electorate. In themselves, new parties are valued because 
they bring different ideas and new policies to the electorate and because of the threat this 
poses to established parties. They help ensure the responsiveness of the political process to 
the evolving wishes of the electorate (Aldrich, 1995; Mulligan and Tsui, 2015). What is more 
difficult to explain, however, is why an unsatisfied group chooses to pursue its political and 
economic goals outside of the structure of existing political parties, particularly when the 
likelihood of success diminishes with the number of established competitors. With the arrival 
of new ideas, the resurgence of older grievances, the arrival of new political agents and the 
always changing social economic landscape, groups wishing to promote change face the 
choice of merging their proposals and policies within the existing political structure or starting 
their own party based on these ideas. This choice will in turn be a function of the rules 
governing entry/exit, the receptivity of the electorate and established parties and the 
attention they can bring to the proposed cause versus the cost and likelihood of success as a 
new party dedicated to these ideas. In all these dimensions India exhibits interesting 
differences that can contribute to an explanation of its particular structure. 
India, like Canada, has never had a political party structure that has conformed to Duverger’s 
law—the dictum that in a state with a first-past-the-post voting rule, the number of political 
 
1 The 14 states included in our analysis are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Although Assam 
has held elections since 1951, its division in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in variations in the number of electoral 
constituencies and instability in the party system over the first three decades. In Jammu and Kashmir elections 
are held every 6 years as opposed to 5 years, and are often held amid heavy security, usually with low voter 
turnout. We have therefore omitted these states from our sample. 
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parties will converge on 2.2 Even at the constituency level, according to Diwakar (2007), “there 
is no unequivocal support for it” (p. 557).3  Explanations for India’s ‘exceptionalism’ are many 
and include Chhibber and Kolman’s (1998) argument that the number of parties depends 
upon the distribution of power between the central and state governments, with greater 
centralization decreasing the incentive to aggregate parties across states and encouraging the 
growth of local and regional parties. Others have pointed to the complexity of social cleavages 
across India (Chhibber and Petrocik, 1989; Yadav and Palshikar, 2003), the presence of a 
strong centrally positioned party (Congress) that encompassed the median voter (Riker, 1982, 
p. 271) and the importance of electoral institutions, such as the anti-defection rule (Nikolenyi, 
2008). In this paper we re-examine the structure of political parties from a broader public 
choice perspective, arguing that a number of complementary political and economic 
influences go into the determination of an equilibrium party structure and test these 
hypotheses empirically. 
Much of the empirical work on political party structures has used cross country analysis 
(Hamel and Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2001; Travits, 2006; Brancati, 2008; Nishikawa; 2010; and 
Bolleyer, 2011). Here cross country differences in political institutions, threshold setup 
requirements, election rules, registration costs and/or party subsidies provide the 
observables to explain why the number of parties and/or rate of party entry/exit has differed 
across countries.4 More recently, a specialized branch of cross country analysis has focussed 
on post-communist emerging economies, seeking to isolate sources of political instability in 
entry-exit conditions (Sikk, 2005; Travits, 2008; Powell and Tucker, 2014). In this paper, 
however, we follow authors like Chhibber and Kollman (1998), Lago and Martinez (2011), 
Lucardie (2007), Chhibber, Jensenius and Suryanarayan(2014), Laroze (2017) and Ferris and 
Voia (2020) by applying the Cox (1997) analysis to party structure within a single country, in 
our case India, one that has had a political constitution that has remained fundamentally the 
same since Independence. Facing a largely unchanged institutional setting for party formation 
and electoral participation, changes in economic and political circumstance become the 
 
2 See Duverger (1954) and Grofman, Bowler and Blais (2009) for a contemporary reassessment. 
3 Note that it is not unusual for an Indian state constituency to feature more than 100 parties. See the descriptive 
statics of the Data Appendix. 
4 It is well known, for example, that democracies with proportional representation as opposed to first-past-the-
post majority or plurality voting generate a larger number of active political parties (Harmel and Robertson, 
1985). 
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variables used to reflect changes in the benefits and cost of party participation.5 By choosing 
Indian states, we can supplement the election data from the relatively short duration of 
India’s democracy (1949-present) with a panel of economic and political state data. Our data 
set includes 14 of the largest Indian states and covers the 178 state elections that were held 
in these 14 states between 1957 and 2013. Because Indian states also vary widely by a number 
development indicators, we also investigate whether the party structure is conditional on 
whether the state is viewed as more or less developed. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a rational choice model that predicts 
the changing structure of political party equilibrium and its implications for party entry and 
exit. Section 3 discusses the measurable proxies that would explain the structure of political 
party equilibrium, entry and exit decisions of parties, and the empirical strategy that becomes 
our basis of testing the model’s predications on Indian states.6 In section 4 we discuss the 
results. The final section concludes by summarizing the major findings of the paper. 
2. An Equilibrium Model of Party Structure with its implications for Party Entry and Exit: 
Cox (1997) provides the general methodology used most often to explain the entry of new 
parties and, implicitly, the number of political parties that arise in a stable political 
equilibrium. In his approach new parties form to enter the electoral arena when the benefits 
a new party can expect to receive from its electoral support exceed the costs of setting up the 
party and contesting an election. Party formation and entry will then continue until the party 
specific benefits of electoral participation fall into line with common entry costs and this 
implies an equilibrium number of political parties. Once equilibrium has been reached, entry 
and exit will follow from changes in the model’s underlying determinants. Variables that proxy 
participation benefits, entry costs and the likelihood of achieving threshold political support 
are then used to test the predictions of the entry/exit hypotheses. This forms the conceptual 
basis of the empirical test described below. 
 
5 Note, however, that we will use two important discrete constitutional changes in our analysis.  
6 The data for this paper will be made available in Dataverse where it is titled Replication Data for the structure 
of political parties in Indian states.  
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More formally, a potential party i in state j at election time period t will register as an entrant 
into the electoral process if the net benefit of entry exceeds the expected cost of entry, that 
is, if   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑁𝑗𝑡−1) × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 >
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠,   (1)  
where 𝑁𝑗𝑡−1 represents the number of parties in state j that are continuing from the previous 
election held in time period t–1.  With the likelihood of success falling as the number of parties 
participating in the election increases, the entry of new parties will stop when the net benefit 
falls to zero.  If in each election there is a flow of potential party entrants for whom the value 
of participating and probability of success differ, the existence of similar setup and 
participation costs will divide the number of potential entrants into two sets where the 
marginal entrant will be the one whose expected benefit just exceeds its expected costs. The 
number of entrants plus the number of continuing parties then determines a temporary 
equilibrium number of political parties participating in the election at time period t. It follows 
that a change in any of the underlying factors that increases the value or likelihood of a new 
party’s electoral success and/or decreases the cost of participation will increase the expected 
number of parties entering and hence the equilibrium number of parties. 
Once a party has entered the electoral arena, the continuation decision will involve a similar 
stopping rule.7 That is an existing party will continue to participate in elections as long as the 
expected benefit of continuing exceeds the cost of participating in an additional election.  
Hence the optimal stopping point is to exit when 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 < 0.     (2) 
Note that the exit decision differs from the entry decision not only in the sense that 
perceptions of the benefits/costs of further participation may be more fully clarified after 
entry but also because the entry decision involves an additional set of once-and-for-all costs 
associated with party set up and registration.8 Once an entrant has entered, setup costs are 
 
7 See Ferris and Voia (2020) for the application of such a stopping rule to party exit and party lifespans in Canada.  
8 The registration cost of setting up a political party in India is minimal (resulting in over 1600 political parties). 
Registration requires: a payment of non-refundable 10,000 Rupees ($140.40 US), support of at least 100 
recorded members with affidavits of stamp paper of at least 2 rupees, registration of the party’s constitution 
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sunk and this implies that parties considering continuation face a lower participation cost than 
entrants. This asymmetry implies that continued electoral presence can be supported even if 
the benefits of participation are found to be somewhat lower than those that motivated initial 
entry.9 
To operationalize these decision rules, we need to identify a set of factors whose levels 
explain the structure of political party equilibrium and whose changes can alter the 
probability of electoral success, the benefit of continued party participation, setup and/or 
continuation costs. Typically, the perceived benefit of electoral participation is private to the 
party and hence externally unobservable. This implies that a test of the theory requires 
finding a set of variables that can span our 14 states and 55 years that provide measures of 
the other three components. In what follows we discuss these measurable proxies in terms 
of four broad categories: the size and heterogeneity of the electorate, the rules and 
conventions that have affected party entry and/or exit, the cost of entering relative to 
continuing in the electoral process, and the role of economic circumstance. 
3. Operationalizing the model and Specifying the Tests 
We begin with a set of factors expected to affect the demand for political parties. Perhaps the 
most common indicators of the demand for political parties are the size and heterogeneity of 
the electorate.10 In general, the larger is the pool of voters relative to the minimum scale of 
voter support needed to justify party participation the larger will be the number of political 
parties that can survive in equilibrium. For any given degree of voter heterogeneity, a larger 
voter base will support a larger number of distinct voter interests. Similarly, for any given size, 
the more diffuse are the interests and aspirations of voters, the larger will be number of 
parties needed to reflect voter interests. In our case this implies that states with larger 
constituency sizes and more heterogeneous constituents are expected to have a larger 
 
and current operating officers and the annual audit party funds. Amended Guidelines for Party Registration, 
online at https://eci.gov.in/candidate-political-parties/political-parties-registration/. This does not imply that 
the setup time and personal expenditure costs to party members are not substantial. 
9 See Forand and Maheshri (2015) and Ferris, Olmstead and Winer (2018) for an analysis of how this cost 
differential implies an asymmetric short run adjustment process about a longer run equilibrium. 
10 See, for example, Taagepera and Grofman (1985), Hug (2000), Clark and Golder (2006), Spoon and West 
(2015), Kapoor and Magesan (2018), and Ferris and Voia (2020). 
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number of political parties. Similarly, changes in these dimensions create opportunities for 
new political parties to enter and challenge incumbents for electoral support. 
Constitution of India, coming into effect in 1950, guaranteed voting rights to every Indian 
citizen above the age of 21 (later reduced to 18 years).11 Hence in addition to district size and 
holding other dimensions of India’s population demographics constant, the size of a 
constituency’s electoral participation will be larger the larger is its voter turnout. Our analysis 
then predicts that the larger are both the number of registered voters in each constituency 
(con_reg_density) and the state’s voter turnout (turnout_state), the larger will be the 
number of political parties.12 Similarly, changes in both these variables will be positively 
related to the entry of new parties and negatively related to their exit. 
We turn next to other indexes of state heterogeneity as a measure of demand for parties. In 
Indian states certain proportions of the seats in state assemblies are reserved for scheduled 
castes (SCs) and scheduled tribes (STs) (reservseat_prop).13 In our sample this varies from a 
low of 9 percent of the seats in Kerala in 1970 to 40 percent of the seats in Odisha in 1971 
with an all-state average of 22 percent. The proportion of reserved seats in the legislature is 
highly correlated (and inversely so) with an index of religious fragmentation (𝜌 = -0.51), 
implying that states with high concentrations of scheduled castes and tribes are not religiously 
diverse (religious_frag).14 Because the legislated affirmative action provided by a higher 
proportion of reserved seats reduces the scale of representation available for general state 
voters, the expectation is that reservseat_prop will be inversely related to the number of 
political parties that arise in equilibrium.  Similarly increases (decreases) in that proportion 
are expected to lead to the exit (entry) of parties. 
To capture heterogeneity among voters more generally, we use two additional measures of 
voter diversity: old, the proportion of the population older than 60, and urbanization, the 
 
11 A constitutional amendment, the 61st amendment, was passed in 1989 to reduce voting age from 21 to 18 
years. 
12 Heath and Ziegfeld (2018) interpret this causality inversely by attributing the change in voter turnout to entry 
and exit.  
13 The percentage of seats reserved for SCs and STs in a state is based on the population shares of SCs and STs. 
The number of reserved seats and their share in total seats in a state changes only when the state is bifurcated 
or new delimitation commission’s recommendations are implemented. For many states reservseat_prop stays 
constant across multiple elections. 
14 To measure religious diversity, we use the inverse of a Herfindahl index of denominational affiliation shares 
in the population, interpolated between censuses and averaged over the previous governing period. 
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percentage of the population in urban areas. An increase in the percentage of older voters is 
expected to reflect greater conservatism in the electorate and the support of fewer parties 
while voters in urban areas are expected to embody greater diversity than those in the 
country and thus may support a larger number of party alternatives.  
When we turn to consider governance rules and conventions that may have affected the 
number of parties by changing the incentives for party entry and/or exit, the 52nd Amendment 
Act of 1985 stands out. Introduced as a way of countering the extraordinary degree of post-
election party switching by legislators,15 the anti-defection amendment prohibits not only 
party defections, but also disqualifies a legislator if that legislator votes (or even abstains from 
voting) contrary to any direction issued by his/her political party (Sethia, 2019, p.28). 
Somewhat ironically, by suppressing internal party dissent the anti-defection amendment is 
thought to have spurred the growth of new political parties by requiring internal factions to 
form an alternative party between elections to allow their voice to be heard. To capture the 
effect of anti-defection we use a dummy variable, anti-defection, that takes the value of 1 in 
all elections following 1985, 0 otherwise. 
A second convention that affects the effectiveness of political parties is party recognition 
status. That is, in addition to having to be registered as a political party to run in an election, 
a political party can qualify to be ‘recognized’ as either a State or a National party if the party 
meets certain minimum vote criteria.16 The biggest advantage of being recognized as a State 
(National) Party is the receipt of a reserved symbol for exclusive use within the state (nation). 
This facilitates party recognition by all voters and aids candidate coordination by allowing all 
contesting candidates from that party to be linked by using the same symbol throughout the 
state.17 There are other advantages received by recognized parties such as subsidized land for 
 
15 Between 1967 and 1983, there had been more than 2700 cases of defections, which brought down over 16 
state Governments. See Sethia (2019, p.25) who, in turn, acknowledges Stanley A Kochanek, ‘Mrs. Gandhi’s 
Pyramid: The New Congress’ in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India (Oxford University Press 2004, 
p78). 
16 The election Symbols Order of 1968 sets any one of five conditions that need to be satisfied for State Party 
status: secure at least 6% of the valid vote and win at least 2 seats in a (Vidhan Sabha) Assembly Election; secure 
at least 6 percent of the valid vote and win at least 1 seats in a (Lok Sabha) General Election; win at least 3 
percent of the seats or at least 3 seats, whichever is more, in an Assembly Election; win at least 1 out of every 
25 seats from a state in a General Election; or secure at least 8 percent of the total valid vote in an Assembly or 
a General Election. There are a similar set of national conditions set for recognition as a National party. 
17 As of 2016 there were 7 National parties and more than 50 State parties versus more than 2300 registered 
parties that were unrecognized. 
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party offices, free air time on India’s autonomous public service broadcaster, the supply of 
electoral roll copies free of cost during elections and other incidentals. By lowering the cost 
of party organization, the introduction of party recognition status in the elections following 
1968 is expected to increase the number of viable political parties in state elections. To test 
this we use a dummy variable, party_recognition, that takes the value of 1 for all elections 
following 1968 and 0 otherwise. 
The National Emergency, declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from 25th June 1975 until 
21st March 1977, has had a significant impact on Indian politics, at both national and state 
levels. Its biggest impact, however, was on the elections that followed immediately after its 
withdrawal. The imposition of emergency made the Congress Party extremely unpopular 
throughout India leading a group of the major political parties to form a coalition, formally 
known as the Janata Party, with the sole objective of defeating the Congress Party. The 
coalition succeeded in defeating the Congress Party at the national level and in most of the 
states in the elections. Because the first elections following the emergency were anomalous, 
a binary variable, emergency, taking the value of 1 only for these elections was used to 
account for emergency’s impact on the number of parties. Given that most of the parties 
opposing the Congress Party had forged a pre-election coalition for the first elections after 
the emergency, we expect the number of contesting parties in these elections to be smaller, 
resulting in the appearance of a decrease in entry and increase in exit in the number of 
parties. 
In India the government at the center can intervene in the operations of state government 
through the imposition of President’s rule.18 President’s rule typically arises when law and 
order collapses or when no state party/coalition is in a position to form the government after 
an election or loses majority in the middle of an electoral tenure.19 The presence of political 
uncertainty in a state under President’s rule should make new parties feel more optimistic of 
success.  For this reason we expect an increase in the number of parties in the elections after 
the presidential rule is revoked. A dummy variable, president, taking the value 1 in the 
 
18 Article 356 of the Indian Constitution deals with the imposition of president’s rule. 
19 Present’s rule had been imposed over 100 times by 2016. 
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elections following the removal of president’s rule (0 otherwise) is used to capture this 
response.20 
During our time period, three new states—Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Uttarakhand—were 
carved out of three of the largest of our states—Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh.  
Our dataset does not include the new states; so that state creation discretely impacts our 
data through a discrete change in the size and composition of the partitioned states and 
hence will affect the number of political parties depending affected the overall heterogeneity 
of the electorate in large states. If state bifurcation influenced the heterogeneity of the 
electorates in these large states in ways unaccounted for in our variables, a lesser number of 
parties should be seen in the post state creation elections, and vice versa. A dummy variable, 
state_creation, taking the value 1 for the post state creation elections of these three large 
states (0 otherwise) is introduced to account for this effect. We have no prior expectation for 
the sign of its coefficient. 
While the number of political parties, the average size of winning seat margin, the duration 
of a government’s survival, and number and likelihood of incumbents re-running for election 
are likely to be endogenous, codetermined in the political equilibrium, random political 
events that change the expected outcome of the upcoming election are likely to have a more 
independent effect on the timing of party entry and exit. In a state where the governing 
party/coalition is expected to dominate its opposition in the sense that it will likely hold a 
large portion of the seats in the legislative assembly, the probability that a potential entrant 
can gain acceptance and/or become part of the governing coalition will be lower. More 
generally the expected benefit of participating in the election should be lower the larger is 
the size of government’s expected majority. Hence we expect that the larger the proportion 
of seats won by the governing party/coalition, seat_prop, the smaller will be the number of 
parties choosing to enter in this election.21 Similarly, the larger is the proportion of state 
legislators who choose to run for re-election, incumbent_prop, the more difficult it will be for 
 
20 India’s governance structure is somewhat unique in that the state Governors are appointed by the President 
(the federal leader) and thus can be of the opposite party to the party in power at the state level. Since 
presidential rule required only a letter in support from the state governor, this was often used to frustrate the 
will of the state government. In a 1994 decision, however, the Supreme Court of India ruled to limit the power 
of the President to declare an emergency without good reason. See Sethia (2019, pp.13-14). 
21 This implies that both current and potential entrants are forward looking with unbiased expectations about 
an election’s likely outcome. 
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competing parties to compete for electoral success. Although in India the share of incumbents 
running for re-election has traditionally been much lower than in either the United States or 
the United Kingdom, incumbents still win roughly 50 percent of the time (Uppal, 2009) and 
their participation is more prevalent at the state than at the national level. Over our sample 
period, incumbent_prop has varied enormously with the share of incumbent candidates 
running for re-election in the assembly elections varying between 40.65 percent in Karnataka 
and 72.17 percent in Bihar.22 Differences in incumbency_prop across states are then 
expected to adversely affect the entry and exit calculus. States where more incumbents run 
for re-election should be associated with fewer parties entering and less successful parties 
choosing to exit. The entry and exit decisions of small parties are also likely to depend on the 
duration of the current governing term.  In India, an elected governing party/coalition can 
govern a state for a maximum period of 5 years. For various reasons, however, the governing 
party/coalition can lose the confidence of the state assembly and this often results in having 
to hold a mid-term election.23 Holding an early election is then usually a sign that the 
incumbent party is in political difficulty and as such should influence favourably the entry and 
exit decision of small political parties. Hence the shorter the governing term, years_elapse, 
the higher should be the number of new parties contesting the next election and the smaller 
should be the number of existing parties exiting. 
Finally, if the demand for political diversity is a normal good, then the demand for parties 
offering different policy programs should rise with income. Other things equal, the number 
of political parties should rise across states with higher levels of incomes and through time as 
state income levels rise. It follows that higher levels of state real GDP per capita, srgdppc, 
should be associated positively with higher numbers of political parties. Similarly, from the 
entrant’s perspective, the cost of raising funds will be lower when times are good while the 
cost of maintaining relatively unsuccessful political activity will be increasingly difficult when 
times are bad. We test for the effects on entry and exit by using the annual average growth 
 
22 Dash et al. (2019) have compiled this statistic for the assembly elections in 14 major Indian states spread over 
period 1962 to 2013. 
23 There are occasions when a governing party/coalition holds an early election because it believes the overall 
state of economy is favorable and its chances of winning re-election are high. A notable example is when the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) called an early election at the 
center in 2004. This, however, is not a common reason for early elections. In India, the more usual reason for an 
early election is due to the governing party/coalition losing its majority in the legislature. 
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rates of per capita income calculated over the governing interval of the incumbent 
government. 
Because the number of parties participating in an election is always a discrete number, the 
analysis that follows uses a fixed effects Poisson count regression model to test for the 
significance of the proposed set of political, institutional and economic conditions expected 
to explain the structure of political parties across Indian states. The equation can be written 
as  
𝐸(𝑁𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼1𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑟𝑒𝑔_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼2𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡 +
 𝛼4 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑡+ 𝛼5𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 − 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼8𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗𝑡, (3) 
where 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼5, 𝛼6, 𝛼7, 𝛼9, and 𝛼11 are expected to be positive while 𝛼3, 𝛼4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼8 are 
expected to be negative; no a priori expectation for 𝛼10. 
The fixed effects Poisson regression equation used to test the entry and exit decisions 
(together with their combination in turnover or churning) use the first differences of a number 
of these variables together with the discrete changes reflecting changes in election rules and 
conventions. Note that three variables discussed above—seat_prop, incumbent_prop, and 
years_elapse—and not included in equation (3) are used in the equations testing party entry, 
exit and turnover.  This is because these variables are expected to have independent effects 
on the timing of and the period specificity of party entry and exit decisions. A table presenting 
the statistical properties of the variables used in the tests that follow are presented in the 
data appendix along with data sources. 
4. Results 
4.1 The number of parties versus effective number of parties 
In Table 1 we present a set of fixed effects Poisson models developing three successive stages 
of a test of the hypotheses explaining the number of political parties arising in our Indian 
states. The models build in complexity: column (1) presents the basic model focusing on the 
size and characteristics of the voter pool together with the level of state per capita income; 
column (2) adds two of the governance institutions specific to India; and column (3) adds 
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three of the more dramatic political events that have affected these states together and 
separately. Column (4) re-runs the full equation model of column (3) on the effective number 
of political parties (ENP),  where ENP weights the significance of each party by its vote share 
and is measured as the inverse of a Herfindahl index of party vote shares.24 A comparison of 
the results from columns (3) and (4) provide some of our most interesting results. 
From an overall perspective, while all of the models work well as an explanation of the 
structure of political parties, the variables provide a better fit for the number rather than the 
effective number of parties. In addition, the doubling of the size of the Chi square statistic as 
we transition across adjacent models, from (1) through (3), confirms that the additional 
variables added to the model do significantly increase the explanatory power of the number 
model. Of the 25 coefficient estimates used to explain party numbers, in columns (1) through 
(3), all 24 of the predicted coefficient signs conform to expectation with 15 significantly 
different from zero at the 90 percent level or higher. 
--inset Table 1 about here-- 
Turning to the individual predictions, the variables representing the size of the voting pool 
have opposing effects on the number versus the effective number of parties. First a larger 
average number of registered voters in a state constituency, con_reg_density, is associated 
with a larger absolute number of parties (as expected) but with having no significant 
association with the effective number of parties.25 This is consistent with a larger voting pool 
attracting an inflow of smaller sized parties that make no discernable impact on the vote 
shares received by the larger state parties. On the other hand, a larger voter turnout, 
turnout_state, has no long run effect on the equilibrium number of parties but does reduce 
significantly (at 1 percent) the effective number of parties. This suggests that higher turnout 
levels tend to reallocate votes towards the smaller sized parties rather than reflect wider 
 
24 ENP(votes)j= 
1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗
2 , where 𝑣𝑖  is the vote share of each political party, i = 1, 2, …N, in state j. We follow Dash et 
al. (2019) by defining a political party as any registered party that appears in the top ten vote receiving parties 
over three successive elections or receives more than 8 percent of the vote in any one election (all other 
parties and individual candidates included in a composite grouping, other). The data used can be found in 
Winer et al (2019) https://dataverse.scholarsportal.info/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5683/SP2/N3GJR4. 
25 Note there is some evidence of nonlinearity in that the addition con_reg_density squared to model (1) 
generates a coefficient estimate that is significantly negative, consistent with the diminishing opportunities for 
parties from larger constituency size. 
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interests that would support a larger number of parties. Together the results suggest that the 
voters who appear in elections with larger turnouts are different from the types of new voters 
that are represented by an increase in the scale of registered participants. 
While an increase in the proportion of reserved seats, reservseat_prop, is associated with a 
decrease in the number of parties, it has a significant negative impact only on the effective 
number of parties.26 That is, the results suggest that while the number of parties is largely 
unchanged following an increase in the proportion of seats reserved for SCs and STs, the vote 
is increasingly concentrated on existing dominant state parties.  
Our two general heterogeneity measures, old and urbanization, present sign estimates 
consistent with their predicted effects.  First, an increase in the proportion of the population 
over sixty is associated with a smaller number of political parties and the contraction of the 
vote about a smaller number of more established parties (increasing ENP). Second, an 
increase in the degree of urbanization within a state or through time appears to be associated 
with larger number of parties (in column (1)), but that association disappears once the effects 
of party_recognition and anti-defection legislation are taken into account. On the other 
hand, the effect of urbanization on ENP(vote) is significant. An increase in urbanization is 
associated with a greater concentration of the vote among established political parties. 
The hypothesis that political diversity through a larger number of political parties is a normal 
good is strongly supported by the data. The data is consistent with an increase in real state 
GDP per capita, srgdppc, increasing not only the number of parties but the effective number 
of parties also. This in turn suggests that higher incomes are associated with a greater 
willingness to support less popular programs and more specialized policies embodied in minor 
parties. 
The effects predicted for the legislative order and the constitutional amendment affecting 
political parties, party_recognition and anti-defection, are present in the data. Both are 
associated with a larger number of political parties but with making no significant impact on 
ENP(vote). Together these results go some way to explaining the larger number of political 
parties found in India in comparison with other countries with similar institutional settings. 
 
26 The collinearity of reservseat_prop and religion_frag led to religion_frag being dropped from the analysis. 
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Lastly, the three instances of dramatic political change impact the states—the emergency, 
the imposition of president’s rule, and new state_creation through the bifurcation of Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh—all are found to have had a significant effect on the 
number of parties but not on ENP(vote). The imposition of presidential rule is associated with 
increasing the number of parties while the imposition of the emergency reduced party 
numbers.  The significant positive coefficient associated with state_creation is consistent with 
bifurcation increasing the average degree of diversity in the electorate. All three outcomes, 
however, again suggest that such political events have impacted party structure primarily 
through changes in the number of smaller parties without having had a significant effect on 
the overall distribution of vote shares among the larger established parties.27 
4.2 Party Entry, Exit and Turnover 
Table 2 presents the results for the Poisson models explaining the entry, exit and turnover of 
political parties. The results are presented in two stages. In the first stage the number of 
parties entering, exiting and turning over (churning) are viewed as depending upon the 
change in the variables used to account for the number of parties, together with the dummy 
variables corresponding to the legislative order, constitutional amendment and political 
events expected to change political party structure. In the second stage we ask whether entry, 
exit and/or churning are also affected by the size of constituency (rather than just its 
stationary rate of change). Overall, all of these models have considerable explanatory power 
(with large 𝜒2 values) and with the addition of the constituency scale variable, the models 
feature a significant increase in both the Wald and log pseudolikelihood functions. 
--insert Table 2 about here-- 
Changes in the size of the voting pool, measured by dcon_reg_density and dturnout_state, 
both are associated positively with party entry but vary in opposite directions with respect to 
both exit and turnover. That is, increases in constituency density are associated with reduced 
exit, an increase in overall party numbers and a reduction in party turnover. A similar increase 
in voter turnout, on the other hand, increases both entry and exit, significantly increasing 
political party turnover while having no significant effect on total party numbers. Larger 
 
27 This does not imply that the vote shares of individual parties did not change dramatically during any of these 
episodes. 
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constituency size, con_reg_density, is not only associated with more parties overall (from 
Table 1) but with a significant increase in party entry, exit and turnover. 
The other heterogeneity measures produce mixed results. An increase in the proportion of 
seats reserved for SCs and STs, dreservseat_prop, does not affect entry, but does significantly 
affect exit, tending to produces a small decrease in party churning. The effect go away, 
however, when the model accounts for the size of constituency. Increases in the percentage 
of the population that is old, dold, has a much stronger effect on discouraging entry than 
encouraging exit, reducing both turnover and total party numbers. A change in urbanization, 
durban, is one of the few variables in the data that is found to have no discernable effect on 
entry, exit or the turnover of parties. 
The data is consistent with the average annual increase in real income per capita over the 
incumbent government’s tenure, growth_real_inc_tenure, increasing new party entry, 
discouraging exit and thus increasing party numbers (with an ambiguous effect on party 
churning). Party numbers then vary pro-cyclically as well as following the growth trend of per 
capita income across time. 
The two legislative changes are both positively associated with entry but have differing effects 
on party exit and turnover. The anti-defection amendment, anti-defection, is strongly 
associated with higher levels of both party entry and exit, increasing the churning of parties 
as well as their absolute number. On the other hand, the granting of party recognition, 
party_recognition, is associated with increased entry and reduced exit, resulting in an overall 
increase in party numbers and a lower rate of party turnover. 
Of the three discrete political events arising in our data, the data indicates that the period of 
the emergency was associated with a significant increase in the exiting of political parties and, 
as Table 1 indicates, an overall reduction in the number of parties. Emergency had a positive 
but a weaker impact on party churning. The imposition of President’s rule, on the other hand, 
is associated with a weak positive effect on entry but has no significant association with party 
exit or turnover. The creation of new states in our time period, state_creation, had a 
significant positive impact on party entry, exit and turnover. State creation, however, loses 
significance once the scale of the constituency is included in the model. 
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Finally, the three characteristics of election outcomes that we argued would be endogenous 
in the long run but whose expectation might influence the timing of party entry and/or exit 
do add explanatory power to the relationship. The data are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the larger is the expected size of winning party’s victory, seat_prop, the smaller will be 
both new party entry and existing party exit and through this a reduction in the turnover rate 
within the political party structure. A larger number of incumbent candidates running for re-
election, incumbent_prop, on the other hand, discourages new entry while increasing existing 
party exit, reducing the number of parties rather than its composition. Finally, an increase in 
the tenure of the incumbent government, years_elapse, leads to higher party exit, but has no 
significant impact on party entry or turnover. 
4.3 Level of Development and Party Structure 
In a country the size of India, average outcomes at the aggregate (national/all-state) level 
often mask the distinctive characteristics of some subgroupings of states. For some 
dimensions of difference, then, it may be insightful to consider whether the effects on party 
structure differ systematically by state groupings. Doing so for India leads to no loss in 
significance since India’s major states are already comparable in size to many of the world’s 
developed and emerging countries.28 In this section we use one state grouping to examine 
the differential effect of our variables on party structure by level of development. Many 
studies examining the role of development have used the binary grouping--BIMAROU versus 
Non-BIMAROU—to subdivide Indian states by level of development.29 The acronym 
BIMAROU, resembling the Hindi word bimar,  meaning‘sick’, is often used to characterize the 
state of development held by the five poorest of our Indian states – (Bi)har, (Ma)dhya 
Pradesh, (R)ajasthan, (O)disha, and (U)ttar Pradesh. These five states lag behind the others in 
our sample in terms of per capita income, literacy, access to public health, education, tap 
water, electricity, toilets and so on. In a recent study applying various measures of electoral 
competitiveness, Dash et al. (2019) found that the evolution of electoral competitiveness in 
the BIMAROU states has been distinctively different from that in the more developed states. 
 
28 In terms of population size, Uttar Pradesh’s is comparable to Brazil, Maharashtra and Bihar to Japan, Madhya 
Pradesh to Germany, and Karnataka and Gujarat to France and Italy. 
29 Ghosh (2016), Mishra and Mishra (2018), Prakash et al (2019), and Dash et al (2019) have used this criterion 
for grouping Indian states. 
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Here we ask whether the determinants of the number of parties and their entry, exit and 
turnover in the BIMAROU states are different from that of the more developed states. 
--insert Table 3 about here-- 
The full equation fixed effects Poisson model (3) from Table 1 is estimated for the BIMAROU 
and Non-BIMAROU subsample states and the results presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
3.  The same exercise was carried out for ENP with the results for the BIMAROU and Non-
BIMAROU states presented in columns (3) and (4). While both explain the equilibrium number 
of parties well, the model fits the data better for the subsample of BIMAROU states with all 
determinants found to be statistically significant. In terms of the explanatory variables, 
state_creation is applicable only to the BIMAROU states, as the three states affected by new 
state creation are part of the BIMAROU grouping. These events had a significant impact on 
party proliferation in post state creation elections. All 10 of the remaining 10 variables were 
found to be statistically significant for the BIMAROU states versus 5 of the 10 variables for the 
Non-BIMAROU states. The results then suggest that party structure in the BIMAROU states 
responds somewhat differently from that in the more developed states.   
When the results from Table 3 are compared with the all-state sample results in column (3) 
of Table 1, the inconclusive findings for three insignificant variables – turnout_state, 
reservseat_prop and urbanization – can be better understood. As Table 3 makes apparent, 
all three variables are significant only for the subsample of the BIMAROU states: in the Non-
BIMAROU states turnout_state has the same expected sign but is insignificant, whereas 
reservseat_prop and urbanization are found to have the opposite sign. The averaging that 
arises in the all-state case then hides the differential type or intensity of response that arises 
within these two groups. Similarly, despite party_recognition and president being found 
significant in the all-state case of Table 1, the two variables are found to be significant only 
for the BIMAROU states despite the similarity in sign found for Non-BIMAROU states.  Both 
variables point to specific characteristics within the BIMAROU states for which these factors 
have greater significance. Finally despite the remaining five variables being found significant 
in all separate and combined cases, the averaging out of the BIMAROU and Non-BIMAROU 
coefficients can be seen to hide differences in the intensity of response across the two state 
groupings.   
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In the all-state case of Table 1, we saw that the determinants explaining the equilibrium 
number of parties sometimes worked differently when used to explain ENP.  In Table 3 we 
can see that the effects on the number and the effective number differ within and between 
the BIMAROU and Non-BIMAROU states. For example, the two variables that represent the 
size of the voting pool, con_reg_density and turnout_state, affect the ENP of developed 
states significantly, whereas only the later affects significantly the ENP of the BIMAROU 
states. The coefficient of con_reg_density in BIMAROU states is insignificant with a sign 
opposite to that of Non-BIMAROU states. This helps to explain the insignificance of 
con_reg_density in the all-state ENP results of Table 1. Determinants such as 
reservseat_prop, old, and srgdppc which were found to be significant in the all-state ENP 
results now lose their significance when states are grouped by level of development. This 
happens despite all three variables possessing their expected signs in both groups of states 
and suggests that these variables work well with ENP only when the sample size increases. 
Urbanization, on the other hand, has a significant impact on ENP irrespective of the sample 
size. None of the remaining variables affect the ENP of the Non-BIMAROU states, whereas all 
three special political events – president, emergency, and state_creation – impact the ENP 
of the BIMAROU states in the expected manner significantly. 
To study the impact of the level of development on party entry, exit and turnover, the full 
model of Table 2 was run on the subsamples of BIMAROU and Non-BIMAROU states. These 
results are presented in Table 4. 
--insert Table 4 about here— 
The results suggest that constituencies that are larger in scale, con_reg_density, experience 
greater party entry, exit and turnover in both groupings of states. However, increases in size 
between elections, dcon_reg_density, are associated with different responses between entry 
and exit that result in different churning results for the BIMAROU and Non-BIMAROU states.  
Entry increases and exit decreases in response to an increase in voter constituency size in 
both with the significant effect on exit in Non-BIMAROU states producing a significant fall in 
party turnover. In BIMAROU states the impact on churning is insignificant. Increases in voter 
turnout, turnout_state, significantly affect only Non-BIMAROU states, increasing party entry, 
churning and total party numbers. The significance found for party entry and turnover in the 
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all-state case of Table 2 is then driven by the outcomes arising in the more developed states. 
Among the measures of voter heterogeneity, and like the results found in the all-state case, 
changes in the proportion of reserved seats in state assemblies, dreservseat_prop, and in the 
rate of urbanization, durban, do not play a major role in inducing party entry, exit and 
turnover for either group of states.  An increase in the proportion of the population that is 
old, dold, tends to reduce party entry, exit and party turnover, but is found to be significant 
only for the Non-BIMAROU developed states. The average growth rate arising over the 
previous governments tenure does not appear to make much difference to party entry and 
exit decisions once states are broken down by levels of development. Higher growth rates are 
associated significantly with higher party entry only for the Non-BIMAROU states (and only at 
the 10 percent level. 
The anti-defection law, anti-defection, has had a strong impact on both party entry and exit, 
resulting an increase in the churning of parties for both categories of states. However, its 
impact has been more consistent and stronger in BIMAROU states. Parties getting electoral 
recognition, party_recognition, has made a significant impact on party entry and churning 
only in the BIMAROU states. These results suggest that both legislative interventions had 
disproportionally larger impact on party structure in the BIMAROU states. 
The imposition of presidential rule, president, and the emergency affect party exit in both 
BIMAROU and Non-BIMAROU states.  The elections held after the emergency produced 
higher party exits in both groups of states, whereas elections following the president’s rule 
experience higher party exits in BIMAROU states and lower exits in Non-BIMAROU states. This 
helps to explain the insignificance of president’s rule and the significance of emergency found 
in the results of Table 2.  The effect of the creation of new states out of the old, 
state_creation, is applicable only to the group of BIMAROU states. These events resulted in 
significantly higher levels of party entry and exit. 
For the electoral variables expected to have an effect on the timing of entry and exit, the 
results find first that when the governing party is expected to win a higher proportion of seats 
in the state assembly, seat_prop, party entry, exit and churning are reduced for both groups 
of states. On the other hand, a higher number of incumbents running for re-election, 
incumbent_prop, is associated with reduced party entry and increased exit, but an unclear 
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impact on party turnover. While these results are statistically significant only for the BIMAROU 
states, they have an overwhelming impact on the all-state findings of Table 2. Finally, an 
increase in the duration of a government’s tenure, years_elapse, has an effect only in increasing 
party exits significantly for both groups of states. The all-state sample results align with these results. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have used data from 14 Indian states to test an equilibrium model of political 
party structure in the spirit of Cox (1997) where the number of parties depend on the average 
voting size of the state’s constituencies, voter turnout, the heterogeneity of the state’s 
electorate, constitutional and/or legislative rules that directly affect party numbers and per 
capita state incomes while controlling for discrete differences across states and a series of 
political events that were expected to have influenced political parties. The factors that stand 
out as significant in the analysis are: the average size of the voter pool in state electoral 
constituencies (positive), the percentage of the state’s population that is above 60 (negative) 
and real GDP per capita (positive). The data also confirm the importance of the Anti-Defection 
constitutional amendment, as hypothesized by Nikolenyi (2008) and others, and the 
importance of acquiring official party recognition in Indian party politics. Both of these 
institutional innovations in the electoral system are consistent with producing a significant 
increase in the number of political parties. The occurrence of significant political events—the 
incidence of presidential rule, the calling of the national emergency and the bifurcation of 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh—all are found to have played a significant role in 
relation to party numbers. 
A comparison of the model explaining the number of political parties to one explaining the 
vote weighted effective number of parties (ENP) is also insightful. Many of the variables that 
were significant in explaining the absolute number of parties are found to lose significance 
when used to explain the effective number of parties (and vice versa). In particular the data 
suggest that a larger sized voting pool and the adoption of the anti-defection and party- 
recognition legislation, while associated with a significant increase in the number of parties, 
have had no significant effect on ENP. On the other hand, increases in both voter turnout and 
the proportion of reserved seats for SC and ST are found to be associated significantly with a 
decrease in ENP (concentrating the vote on larger more established parties) while having no 
21 
 
 
significant effect on the total number of state parties. Together these suggest that the factors 
that explain the proliferation of parties are different from those that explain the 
concentration of the vote among parties. 
The analysis also considers the effect of changes in these variables, together with period-
specific political factors such as the openness and closeness of the upcoming election, on the 
timing decision by political parties of whether to enter and exit (and thus the rate of political 
party turnover). Of particular significance in explaining party entry were: changes in 
constituency size (positive), voter turnout (positive), the proportion of the population that is 
over 60 (negative), per capita income growth (positive), party recognition (positive) and the 
anti-defection amendment (positive). Voter turnout, which was found to have no significance 
effect on the total number of parties, is found to be highly significant in relation to entry and 
turnover through its change (rather than level). That is, an increase in turnout across elections 
is associated not only with new party entry but with greater exit and hence a higher level of 
party turnover. Good times, as reflected in higher growth rates during the previous governing 
tenure, are reflected in greater party entry, fewer parties exiting and hence larger party 
numbers. Interestingly, the data also suggest that while increases in constituency size work 
as expected in increasing entry, discouraging exit and hence lowering party turnover, a large 
constituency is itself associated not only with larger party numbers but with greater new party 
entry, older party exit and turnover. That is, larger scale is associated with proportionally 
more electoral variation and turnover, particularly among the smaller sized political parties.  
Lastly, the perception of the party’s election prospects, as proxied (inversely) by the 
proportion of incumbents running for re-election and the size of the winning seat margin, is 
highly significant in its association with party entry, exit and turnover. 
By grouping our 14 Indian states by BIMAROU (lesser developed) and Non-BIMAROU (more 
developed) states, we investigated whether the nature of party structure depends on the 
level of development arising between these states. The results indicate that the determinants 
of party structure in BIMAROU states differ somewhat from those in Non-BIMAROU states 
and these differences help to explain why some determinants were found to be statistically 
insignificant when the all-states sample is used. While the all-state model used earlier explains 
successfully the evolution of the number of parties in both groupings, the model fits the data 
better for the BIMAROU states.  All variables are significant in the BIMAROU case while only 
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half are significant for the more developed states. Measures of the size of the voting pool, the 
number of registered voters in constituencies and voter turnout, are the major determinants 
of both the number and the effective number of political parties in the developed states, 
whereas in addition to these factors party-recognition and special unsettling events such as 
the imposition of presidential rule, the emergency, and events leading to new state creation 
have played major role in determining both measures in the BIMAROU states. Party entry and 
exit decisions in the BIMAROU states are sensitive to factors such as change in the size of 
registered voters, implementation of the anti-defection law, creation of new states, and 
percentage of incumbents seeking reelection, whereas factors such as constituencies with 
large sized registered voters, change in the size of older population, and the size of 
government’s majority affect the entry and exit decisions in the Non-BIMAROU states. 
Impacts of different factors on party entry and exit decisions play out differently in different 
groups of states, results in varying net impact on party turnover. The party turnover model 
works better with the subsample of Non-BIMAROU states. 
Overall we have found that the data for Indian states are consistent with the use of a rational 
choice model of political party structure to explain the evolving number of political parties in 
Indian states together with its entrants and exits. The analysis works less well as an 
explanation of ENP. The results suggest that the structure of Indian state political parties is 
highly responsive to changes in constituency characteristics, economic conditions, electoral 
rules and the likelihood of success and that that response arises primarily through the active 
participation, entry, exit and turnover of small aspiring political parties.  
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Table 1 
Fixed Effects Poisson Models of the Number and Effective Number of Indian State Parties: 
14 Indian States, 1957 – 2013 
Variable           Predicted 
Sign 
Number 
of parties 
 
(1) 
Number 
of Parties 
 
(2) 
Number of 
Parties 
 
(3) 
Effective Number 
of Parties (vote 
shares) 
(4) 
con_reg_density + 0.012*** 
(23.06) 
0.009*** 
(18.94) 
0.008*** 
(13.68) 
0.001 
(1.13) 
turnout_state + 0.316 
(0.86) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.105 
(0.28) 
-0.691*** 
(3.03) 
reservseat_prop - -0.573 
(1.13) 
-0.837 
(0.98) 
-0.708 
(0.77) 
-1.42* 
(1.83) 
old - -0.104*** 
(3.08) 
-0.164*** 
(4.75) 
-0.154*** 
(5.01) 
0.036** 
(1.99) 
urbanization + 0.014** 
(2.20) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.017** 
(2.52) 
srgdppc + 0.004** 
(2.11) 
0.009*** 
(4.92) 
0.01*** 
(4.97) 
0.003** 
(2.1) 
party_recognition +  0.165* 
(1.74) 
0.201** 
(2.06) 
0.013 
(0.17) 
anti_defection +  0.411*** 
(4.92) 
0.417*** 
(4.84) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
president +   0.083** 
(2.12) 
-0.009 
(0.35) 
emergency -   -0.212*** 
(3.82) 
-0.101 
(1.56) 
state_creation ?   0.131*** 
(4.1) 
-0.024 
(0.29) 
Statistics      
No. of States  14 14 14 14 
Observations  167 167 167 167 
Log pseudolikelihood  -451.2 -433.3 -427.7 -238 
Wald 𝝌2(6, 8, 11 
variables) 
 1300.5 2782.3 11013 483.7 
Notes: All models include state fixed-effects. ***(**)[*] = significant at 1% (5%) 10%. ? = just misses significance 
at 10%. Absolute value of robust z-statistics in brackets below coefficient estimates.  
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Table 2 
Fixed Effects Poisson Models of Party Entry and Exit 
14 Indian States: 1957 – 2013 
 
Variables 
 
Parties 
Entering 
(1) 
Parties 
Entering 
(2) 
Parties 
Exiting 
(3) 
Parties 
Exiting 
(4) 
Churning 
 
(5) 
Churning 
 
(6) 
con_reg_density  0.007*** 
(6.70) 
 0.02*** 
(6.52) 
 0.012*** 
(9.66) 
dcon_reg_density          0.01** 
(2.49) 
0.008*** 
(2.81) 
-0.016** 
(2.01) 
-0.026*** 
(7.59) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.004 
(1.52) 
dturnout_state 1.12*** 
(4.06) 
0.94*** 
(4.55) 
0.79* 
(1.93) 
0.15 
(0.48) 
1.06*** 
(3.76) 
0.725*** 
(6.39) 
dreservseat_prop -0.005 
(1.09) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.015*** 
(2.74) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.009*** 
(3.35) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
dold -0.244 
(1.19) 
-0.419*** 
(3.01) 
0.047 
(0.14) 
-0.369 
(1.53) 
-0.13 
(0.54) 
-0.393*** 
(2.78) 
durban 0.027 
(0.51) 
0.019 
(0.47) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.017 
(0.47) 
0.014 
(0.26) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
growth_real_inc_tenure 0.035** 
(2.00) 
0.023* 
(1.74) 
0.01 
(0.5) 
-0.027* 
(1.72) 
0.027* 
(1.70) 
0.006 
(0.72) 
party_recognition 0.479*** 
(3.10) 
0.292** 
(2.05) 
0.11 
(0.71) 
-0.388*** 
(4.03) 
0.28* 
(1.86) 
-0.016 
(0.20) 
anti-defection 1.17*** 
(11.29) 
0.73*** 
(6.12) 
1.02*** 
(8.43) 
-0.181 
(0.94) 
1.12*** 
(12.5) 
0.409*** 
(4.27) 
president 0.067 
(0.89) 
0.126* 
(1.84) 
-0.151 
(1.38) 
-0.024 
(0.25) 
-0.018 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(1.14) 
emergency -0.291 
(1.38) 
-0.3 
(1.47) 
0.528*** 
(4.94) 
0.551*** 
(5.15) 
0.144? 
(1.63) 
0.14* 
(1.69) 
state_creation 0.703*** 
(5.06) 
0.156 
(1.11) 
0.865*** 
(9.87) 
-0.493 
(1.34) 
0.772*** 
(8.35) 
-0.081 
(0.64) 
seat_prop -1.29*** 
(3.91) 
-0.795** 
(2.22) 
-1.48*** 
(4.94) 
-0.287 
(0.99) 
-1.38*** 
(5.11) 
-0.614*** 
(2.36) 
incumbent_prop -0.754** 
(2.15) 
-0.454* 
(1.71) 
-0.019 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(2.62) 
-0.473 
(1.32) 
-0.023 
(0.16) 
years_elapse -0.021 
(0.40) 
0.013 
(0.24) 
0.053 
(1.08) 
0.118*** 
(2.64) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
0.055 
(1.46) 
Statistics       
No. of States 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Log pseudolikelihood -390.4 -373.9 -410.9 -343.1 -462.4 -395.2 
Wald 𝝌𝟐(14, 15 variables) 29490.2 4260.2 8675 2751.5 439346.3 683.6 
Notes: All models include state fixed-effects. ***(**)[*] = significant at 1% (5%) 10%. ? = just misses significance 
at 10%. Absolute value of robust z-statistics in brackets below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 3 
Fixed Effects Poisson Models of the Number and Effective Number of Indian State Parties: 
14 Indian States, 1957 – 2013 (BIMAROU (5) versus Non-BIMAROU (9) States) 
Variable           Number of parties 
Effective Number of Parties 
(vote shares) 
 BIMAROU 
States 
(1) 
Non-BIMAROU 
States 
(2) 
BIMAROU 
States 
(3) 
Non-BIMAROU 
States 
(4) 
con_reg_density 0.004*** 
(2.60) 
0.008*** 
(5.96) 
-0.001 
(0.15) 
0.004** 
(2.30) 
turnout_state 0.544* 
(1.81) 
-0.334 
(0.58) 
-0.432*** 
(2.87) 
-0.453** 
(2.32) 
reservseat_prop 2.03*** 
(3.88) 
-1.94 
(1.23) 
-1.88 
(1.45) 
-0.811 
(0.96) 
old -0.354*** 
(8.66) 
-0.098*** 
(5.48) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
-0.006 
(0.24) 
urbanization -0.049*** 
(2.72) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.025* 
(1.74) 
-0.01** 
(2.00) 
srgdppc 0.036*** 
(5.87) 
0.01*** 
(3.87) 
0.006 
(1.46) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
party_recognition 0.697*** 
(5.53) 
0.081 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.30) 
anti_defection 0.836*** 
(7.02) 
0.382*** 
(3.65) 
0.061 
(0.62) 
-0.09 
(1.16) 
president 0.081*** 
(5.05) 
0.088 
(1.19) 
0.043*** 
(4.33) 
-0.003 
(0.10) 
emergency -0.367*** 
(5.71) 
-0.121* 
(1.70) 
-0.365*** 
(7.76) 
0.025 
(0.57) 
state_creation 0.181*** 
(9.79) 
 0.075** 
(2.33) 
 
Statistics     
No. of States 5 9 5 9 
Observations 60 105 60 105 
Log pseudolikelihood -140.1 -266.4 -85.5 -147.6 
Wald 𝝌2(10, 11 variables) 99.5 724 484 187.4 
Notes: All models include state fixed-effects. ***(**)[*] = significant at 1% (5%) 10%. ? = just misses significance 
at 10%. Absolute value of robust z-statistics in brackets below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 4 
Fixed Effects Poisson Models of Party Entry and Exit 
14 Indian States: 1957 – 2013 (BIMAROU (5) versus Non-BIMAROU (9) States) 
Variables Parties Entering Parties Exiting Churning 
  
BIMAROU 
States 
(1) 
Non-
BIMAROU 
States 
(2) 
 
BIMAROU 
States 
(3) 
Non-
BIMAROU 
States 
(4) 
 
BIMAROU 
States 
(5) 
Non-
BIMAROU 
States 
(6) 
con_reg_density 0.002 
(1.08) 
0.008*** 
(3.66) 
0.024*** 
(9.57) 
0.017*** 
(4.50) 
0.01*** 
(9.97) 
0.011*** 
(4.50) 
dcon_reg_density          0.014*** 
(4.36) 
0.006 
(1.07) 
-0.019*** 
(4.86) 
-0.032*** 
(7.64) 
0.003 
(1.24) 
-0.008** 
(2.17) 
dturnout_state -0.164 
(0.32) 
0.906*** 
(4.26) 
0.379 
(0.42) 
0.52 
(1.79) 
0.17 
(0.50) 
0.845*** 
(5.64) 
dreservseat_prop 0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.012 
(0.63) 
-0.004 
(0.54) 
0.019 
(1.38) 
-0.002 
(0.44) 
0.002 
(0.26) 
dold -0.361 
(0.91) 
-0.472** 
(2.41) 
0.335 
(1.28) 
-0.56*** 
(3.15) 
-0.06 
(0.19) 
-0.484*** 
(3.07) 
durban 0.06 
(0.56) 
0.022 
(0.48) 
-0.105 
(1.33) 
-0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.075 
(1.05) 
0.011 
(0.28) 
growth_real_inc_tenure -0.014 
(1.17) 
0.034* 
(1.69) 
-0.005 
(0.15) 
-0.009 
(0.41) 
-0.013 
(1.51) 
0.019 
(1.50) 
party_recognition 1.02*** 
(3.06) 
0.114 
(0.78) 
-0.559 
(1.11) 
-0.179 
(0.95) 
0.48* 
(1.73) 
-0.075 
(0.65) 
anti-defection 1.06*** 
(5.54) 
0.674*** 
(3.74) 
-0.449*** 
(2.56) 
-0.042 
(0.18) 
0.518*** 
(6.24) 
0.447*** 
(3.58) 
president 0.04 
(0.63) 
0.166 
(0.95) 
0.14** 
(2.51) 
-0.218* 
(1.72) 
0.069 
(1.41) 
0.022 
(0.21) 
emergency -0.727 
(1.59) 
-0.127 
(0.68) 
0.638*** 
(3.07) 
0.434*** 
(2.83) 
-0.031 
(0.24) 
0.164 
(1.37) 
state_creation 0.514** 
(2.38) 
 0.751*** 
(3.65) 
 0.25 
(0.24) 
 
seat_prop -1.58*** 
(2.71) 
-0.696* 
(1.66) 
0.224 
(0.36) 
-0.667* 
(1.76) 
-0.877* 
(1.93) 
-0.784** 
(2.32) 
incumbent_prop -1.68*** 
(4.12) 
-0.283 
(0.67) 
1.49* 
(1.82) 
0.171 
(0.84) 
-0.505 
(1.39) 
-0.118 
(0.53) 
years_elapse -0.054 
(1.16) 
0.04 
(0.40) 
0.158*** 
(3.92) 
0.123** 
(2.20) 
0.039 
(1.55) 
0.068 
(0.93) 
Statistics       
No. of States 5 9 5 9 5 9 
Observations 55 97 55 97 55 97 
Log pseudolikelihood -126.4 -239.8 -121.2 -210.6 -132.3 -255.3 
Wald 𝝌𝟐(14, 15 variables) 195.4 657.9 20.8 38.5 24.5 443.4 
Notes: All models include state fixed-effects. ***(**)[*] = significant at 1% (5%) 10%. ? = just misses significance 
at 10%. Absolute value of robust z-statistics in brackets below coefficient estimates. 
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Data Appendix 
Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics (14 State averages: 1957-2013) 
Variable Mnemonic Obs. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min    Max 
Average number of registered 
constituency voters (1000’s)  
con_reg_density 178 120.32 52.38 39.2   316.1 
Change in constituency’s density dcon_reg_density 164 10.61 10.58 -36.9   35.9 
Voter turnout rate by state turnout_state 178 0.618 0.107 0.24     0.86 
Change in voter turnout dturnout_state 164 0.017 0.083 -0.43    0.44 
Number of registered Parties 
contesting election 
election_parties 178 23.43 24.10 3           222 
New parties entering state election entering_parties 171 12.82 15.75 0            147 
Parties exiting following election exiting_parties 171 8.25 8.38 0             55 
Turnover of political parties churn 171 21.07 22.74 1           202 
Proportion of legislative seats that 
are reserved 
reservseat_prop 178 0.221 0.076 0.09      0.4 
Change in the proportion of 
reserved seats 
dreservseat_prop 164 0.002 0.017 -0.11  0.079     
Inverse of Herfindahl Index of 
religious fragmentation 
religion_frag 167 0.278 0.133 0.05      0.6 
Proportion of seats won by the 
governing coalition/party 
seat_prop 178 0.632 0.103 0.5     0.848 
Proportion of incumbents running 
for re-election 
incumbent_prop 153 0.557 0.177 0.125 0.959 
Proportion of the state population 
over 60 
old 167 6.83 1.19 4.97   12.6 
Change in population old dold 153 0.257 0.268 -0.52    1.35 
Percentage of the population in 
Urban areas 
urbanization 167 24.7 9.14 6.32    48.4 
Change in urbanization durban 153 1.31 1.49 -3.32 10.87 
State real GDP per capita (1000’s) srgdppc 167 10.67 17.19 1.85   87.17 
Growth rate of real income per 
capita over previous government’s 
tenure 
growth_real_inc_
tenure 
165 2.86 3.26 -6.42 16.43 
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